Abstract-This paper presents a practical expert system for the diagnosis of various faults which may occur in the distribution substations. The backward inexact reasoning process is applied for the fault section estimation using the knowledge of topology, the operation rules of protective devices, heuristic knowledge of well-trained operators, and instantaneous alarms. In this paper, the overall structure, detailed knowledge-base and the efficiency of general methodology based on topology will be discussed. The proposed system has been tested in a local control center in Korea as a part of an intelligent guidance system for the SCADA operators.
I. INTRODUCTION

D
URING the last few decades, many expert systems have been proposed to cope with various operational problems in power systems-fault diagnosis, alarm processing, and restoration etc.-for the eventual dream of the fully automated reliable power systems. Regarding the fault diagnosis or fault section estimation problem, Fukui [1] and other papers [2] , [3] have proposed the expert system approaches to diagnose the faults in a transmission network.
Regarding the substations, since the substation automation has become a major issue, many fault diagnosis systems [4] - [9] have been proposed. Protopapas [4] proposed an interactive expert system for nonexperts using PC-SCADA. Venkata [5] proposed a basic expert system approach on the ICPS (integrated control and protection system). Japanese power companies have announced many prototype or practical systems [6] - [9] for a substation. Kansai Power Company has developed one for a 500 kV substation [6] , and another one for a 275 kV substation [7] . Tokyo Electric Power Company has developed a supervisory system [8] , and Chubu Power Company presented a frame based expert system [9] . This paper presents a practical expert system for the fault diagnosis for multiple distribution substations combined with a SCADA system. Like many countries, the Korean power system has applied the hierarchical distributive control structure. There are one Manuscript received July 31, 1996; revised April 10, 1997 and September 24, 1998. This work was supported by the Korea Electric Power Corporation and Electrical Engineering Science and Research Institute (EESRI 97-Jung-01).
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MCC (main control center) at the top level, a few RCC's (regional control centers) at the medium level, and many LCC's (local control centers) as the subsidiaries of RCC's. The major functions of a LCC are the monitoring and control of affiliated distribution substations. Ninety percent of the substations are unmanned by now. The proposed system was installed as a part of the intelligent guidance system in a LCC in Korea, and has been tested since 1994.
The proposed system has all the advanced functions such as the fault diagnosis on multiple substations with multiple faults, inexact reasoning, and hypothesis generation (explanation function) including the discrimination of the false or nonoperation of the protective devices. Other state-of-the-art systems also have some of these functions.
Another special feature of this system is the utilization of knowledge to describe the general topological information [10] . This feature contributes to the compact and efficient structure of the integrated guidance system, and enhancement of the overall performance.
In this paper, the data structure of the protective devices and its relation to the knowledge for general topology will be discussed at first by the analysis of human experts. Second, the uncertainty manipulation that is closely related with not only the identification of false operation or nonoperation of devices but also multiple diagnosis function, will be discussed. Finally, a brief overview on the test environment such as the man-machine interface and the interface to the main intelligent guidance system will be followed.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF OPERATORS
A typical distribution substation in Korea consists of 2-4 transmission lines (TL's), double high voltage buses (HBUSes), 2-4 main transformers (MTR's) and a few couples of low voltage distribution buses (LBUSes) including many switches such as circuit breakers (CB's) and line switches (LSes), as shown in the Fig. 2 . Besides, there are many kinds of protective relays, which will be presented in detail at the next section. As mentioned before, these substations are almost unmanned in the urban area in Korea. About 8-12 substations are controlled by a local control center by remote control.
When a fault occurs, many alarms are transmitted into the minor-SCADA-a small scale SCADA compared with that in a RCC. Then the operators look at the alarm pages on a monitor and the other graphic displays corresponding to the alarm set. As the next process, they begin to infer to estimate the fault sections based on the received alarms and the graphic displays. The reason of their looking at the CRT's is that not only the displays 0885-8977/00$10.00 © 2000 IEEE show the states of switching devices, but also the black-out region can be identified easily on the CRT's since it is clear that the fault sections exist within the black-out areas.
Another important reason is that the tripping breakers which are subject to a protective relay may depend on the states of other switches. The operator's inference is definitely based on this topological information, especially when a bus differential relay operated. Fig. 1 illustrates the situation.
Both Fig. 1(a) and (b) represent the states of CB's and LSes in the prefault stage. In the Fig. 1(a) , when the bus-tie breaker is off and T/L #1 supplies power to the MTR #1 and #2, then the bus differential relay #1(87B1) will trip the breakers B1, B4, and B5 if there happens a fault at the high voltage bus #1. In case of a fault in the bus #2, the relay 87B2 will trip B2 and B6. In the Fig. 1(b) , the tripping breakers which are subject to the 87B1 will be B1, B4, and B3-the bus-tie breaker. The 87B2 will trip B2, B3, B5, and B6. These assignments are automatically set by the internal electro-mechanical interlocking system. Although the topology of this example is fairly simple, there could be 64 different combinations of tripping breaker sets according to the states of switching devices. For a larger substation that may have 4 TL's and 4 MTR's, there could be 512 combinations even if it is assumed that all transmission lines are in use. Considering the reserved lines would generate additional combinations.
Since the operators are good at this mechanism, they look at the monitor and analyze the causal relationship based on their topological knowledge. In fact, it is a simple knowledge that if afault occurs in a bus , the differential relay will trip the breakers which are connected to the bus . Therefore, the main issue is how to interpret the linguistic terms using an AI language or tools. It is a well-known fact that the number of rules is an important point to enhance the performance of an expert system. But it should be noted that since a rule consists of several terms including the facts in the knowledge base, the definitions and data structure of the terms and facts also play an important role in realizing the general human knowledge. It will enhance the performance and generality of the system eventually. Furthermore, since a term is not only a part of a rule but also a basic target in the searching process such as the unification, the definitions and data structure of terms are very important.
Basic data structure of the major facts are as follows. Fig. 2 shows the basic elements of a substation. Besides these basic elements, there are many protective devices in a substation. The basic operation rules of these protective devices such as the over-current relay, bus protective relay, transformer differential relay, Buchholtz relay, and pressure relay consist of a part of the entire knowledge base. The relays are represented as follows. of the relay, and "fault_type" is to discriminate the OCR and OCGR (over-current ground relay).
III. DATA REPRESENTATION
1) Representation of the Protective Devices:
Bus Protective Relay (87B)-bus_diff(substation_name, bus_number):
A bus relay is installed at each high voltage bus for differential protection. If the alarm of this relay happens, the tripping breakers set will be determined promptly using the prefault states of other switches.
Transformer Differential Relay (87T)-tr_diff(substa-
tion_name, tr_number): Herein, "tr_number" is the number of the main transformer. Beside these three kinds of major relays, there are other relays which protect the main transformer. Usually the transformer differential relay will operate when a transformer fault occurs. But, there could be additional operations of the following relays. Since these alarms are available in a SCADA system, the detailed diagnosis regarding the main transformer is possible. The proposed system also utilizes the information of the following relays. 4. Lockout Relay-heavy86(substation_name, tr_number). 5. Buchholtz Relay-96B2(substation_name, tr_number). 6. Pressure Valve-96P(substation_name, tr_number). 7. Sudden Pressure Valve-press(substation_name, tr_number).
2) Representation of Unit Devices:
Since the proposed system is designed for multiple substations as a part of the integrated intelligent guidance system, it is designed to share the common knowledge on the topology with a restoration aid expert system [10] for the better efficiency. The representation of the components and the knowledge of topology in the restoration aid system have been slightly modified and updated recently.
1. Transmission Line: tl(s/s_name, tl_name, r, x, c, capacity, t l_type). . Herein, the item nos. 1-7 represent the components. Nos. 8 and 9 are to represent the connectivity between the buses. These connection paths are important for the fault diagnosis system to identify the fault propagation paths when the responsible CB's or relays have failed to operate. In the restoration system, the interlocking sequence is dealt using these facts. no. 10-12 represent the basic topology. For example, there is a fact for the system shown in the Fig. 2. hbus to tr alpha This predicate defines the linguistic topological knowledge that the main transformer #2 in the alpha substation can be connected to a hbus through the CB #7 and LS #9 or LS #17. To identify the exact connection at a time is simply done by inspecting the states of the CB #7, LS #9, and LS #17. Of course, there are two other facts for the HBUSes.
hbus alpha hbus alpha IV. KNOWLEDGE BASE 1) Database: A knowledge base consists of the database and a rule base. As described before, the basic information of the devices including protective relays and the alarms are included in the database. Besides, there are additional analog measurements such as real/reactive powers, voltages and currents at several points, which are monitored periodically by the SCADA system. Although this information does not indicate the fault section directly since there could be controlled operations, it is used to verify the diagnostic results in this system. 2) Rule-Base: A lot of of rules are stored in the rule-base, which are classified into the following categories.
1. Rules to define the topological terms.
2. Rules to find the actual connection paths.
3. Rules to find the fault propagation. 4. Operating rules of the protective devices. 5. Rules to discriminate the false operation and/or nonoperation of the protective devices. 6. Heuristic rules. 7. Rules for the fault section estimation. 8. Rules to generate the hypotheses and reports. Since these rules are represented in general terms, they can be applied to all the substations in the LCC regardless of the number of lines, transformers, distribution buses, and distribution lines. It means that the number of rules is independent upon the number of elements in each substation. This feature is the same as that of human experts. Some examples of the rules in the linguistic form are as follows.
R1. If a fault occurs in a transformer, then the transformer differential relay will not operate with a low possibility. R2. If a transformer differential relay operates, then it will trip the two breakers connected to the transformer. R3. If a fault occurs in a transformer and if the transformer differential relay does not operate, then the over-current relay at the primary side of the transformer would operate with a high possibility. R4. If a transformer is connected to a high voltage bus, then the bus is the upper bus of the transformer. Herein, R1 and R3 are the examples of the operating rules of protective devices. R2 is an example of a rule for nonoperation of the protective devices. R4 is an example of the back-up operation rule, and R5 is a rule to define the topological terms. In the practical system, over 300 PROLOG style rules had been developed, and then they had been translated into the C-language for the effective link with the main program and the other expert subsystems such as the fault diagnosis expert system for the transmission system and the restoration plan generation system for substations. The knowledge is based on the causal relationships as shown in the Table I. Although the protection mechanism is different according to the elements to protect, the table describes the general relationships. R1 to R4 are the examples of the general concepts for the transformers. Detailed analysis on the causal relationships will be followed. When a fault occurs in a substation element, a corresponding protective relay will be operated usually. Then the relay will trip one or multiple circuit breakers. The operated relay and tripped circuit breakers will generate the alarms. It is obvious that the cause of a breaker's trip is a relay, and a fault causes the relay operation. But in case of the nonoperation or false operation, the situation will be complex. In this paper, a false operation means an operation of a device by disturbances or malfunction without any proper cause. In Table I , it should be noted that the analysis part of the table is correct only if both the causes and results are known exactly, and if there happens a single fault. But, in the real system, only the results are known by the form of alarms. For the cases of multiple faults, the situation will be more complex. Since there are many possible solutions, even in the case of a single fault, inexact reasoning is indispensable in nature. Fig. 3 illustrates an example which will show the basic principles of the fault diagnosis of the proposed system.
Example: If it is assumed that a fault occurred only at the HBUS #1 in Fig. 3 , the following hypothesis is a reasonable solution.
Possible solution #1 Fault occurred at the HBUS #1. 87B1 tripped the CB1, CB3, and CB4. CB3 failed to trip. 87B2 operated to trip the CB2, CB3, CB5, and CB6. Using the same inference procedure, by just exchanging the operation sequence of 87B1 and 87B2, the next solution is also reasonable.
Possible solution #2
Fault occurred at the HBUS #2. 87B2 operated to trip the CB2, CB3, CB5, and CB6. CB3 failed to trip. 87B1 tripped the CB1, CB3, and CB4. These two solutions are based on the single fault assumption. In fact, there are many solutions as shown in Table II. As mentioned above, it is clear that the discrimination of the nonoperation and false operation is possible in general only with the assumption of the fault section. The possibilities of nonoperation and false operations were carefully assigned to each device by the analysis of the past fault history in the KEPCO TABLE II  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS system. Briefly speaking, the possibility orders were assigned as follows.
p(nonoperation of a CB) p(nonoperation of a relay) p(false-operation of a relay) p(simultaneous multiple fault)
Based on the possibility theory, the system generates the six solutions for this example. In Table II , it is obvious that the solution nos. 1 and 2 have the same possibility if the time information is not given. Although the time information is available by the SOE (sequence of events) option in most SCADA systems, it is disabled usually in the KEPCO system. If it is available and it is the perfect information, then one of the two solutions will be absolutely meaningless. The proposed system does not consider the time information now.
VI. INFERENCE FLOW
As the proposed system is a part of an intelligent guidance system, the whole inference flow is affected by the main expert system. Fig. 4 shows the brief inference flow including the cooperation with the main system. At a normal state, the main expert system monitors the states of switching devices and updates the topology data if some changes are detected from the periodically scanned data in the SCADA. When an alarm set is received from SCADA due to the faults, preprocessing is required because each of the original alarms is only a few bytes of digital codes. The main system converts the codes to the linguistic predicates. As a next process, the main system saves the previous states of devices as a prefault data, updates the topology, and calls the diagnosis system. In this stage, the fault diagnosis system generates the possible solutions one by one. The backward reasoning method is utilized at this stage. The next step is the ordering process based on the possibility of each solution. For the generation of the hypotheses, dynamic database is utilized. Finally, when the report is generated, the main system calls the restoration aid expert system and transfer the information of estimated fault sections.
VII. STRUCTURE OF THE TEST SYSTEM
As mentioned above, the proposed expert system has been installed in a practical intelligent guidance system for the SCADA operators. Fig. 5 shows the overall structure of the test system. A minor SCADA system (GS-TADCOM 1000) shares the data with the intelligent guidance system using the dual data link system. The intelligent system consists of a main expert system and the four subsidiary expert systems-the proposed system, the fault diagnosis system for the transmission system, and the restoration aid systems.
The intelligent system was developed using a low-cost personal computer (IBM-PC/486). The system was installed in the Ui-Jung Bu local control center nearby the capital Seoul in 1994 and has been tested by now. The system is still in the progress. Many functions will be updated sooner or later. For example, the integrated fault diagnosis system is under development for the cooperation the two diagnosis systems.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
An on-line fault diagnosis expert system was developed to assist the SCADA operators. The system diagnoses various faults in multiple substations based on the inexact reasoning process. A topology-based general representation method and the discrimination of false and nonoperation including the dealing of multiple faults were discussed in detail.
The system had been originally developed for the purpose of substation automation system. But it was applied to the SCADA system as a part of the intelligent guidance system due to its generality. The system can diagnose any kind of faults within one second even in the most complex cases.
The system has been tested in a local control center nearby the capital area in Korea since 1994.
The four years test and over 60 case studies on the past fault history of the real power system have proved the 100% diagnostic performance of the system, which means that the real fault sections have been exactly estimated by the most possible solution generated by the system for all the cases.
